Matteo Pugliese

Russia’s foreign policy shows common patterns in Africa and Latin America, where its soft power strategy seems closely aligned with the military and economic agenda. The Kremlin’s soft power is primarily based on two pillars: media-driven propaganda on the one hand, and cultural engagement on the other. Recent media investigations confirmed that, in fact, these influence efforts are covertly pursued by Russia’s intelligence and military apparatus. From Chad to Argentina, secret services and former Wagner members are involved in clandestine actions and active measures disguised as harmless initiatives. Africa and Latin America are the continents where the dynamics of great power competition and the emerging new world order are most evident.

Africa: GRU and SVR competing networks

In Africa, French influence has declined sharply, following several setbacks across the Sahel. The US engagement has similarly decreased due to new priorities set by the Trump administration, despite a recent policy change to cooperate with Mali and its allies “on shared security and economic interests”. In this regard, it is worth noting that, following the coup in 2023, hundreds of US troops were expelled from Niger, where the only remaining Western military presence is Italy’s bilateral mission MISIN, stationed in the same airbase – but separate barracks – of Russia’s paramilitary.

In this context, Moscow’s involvement has expanded significantly. From 2020 to 2023, Russia’s public approval grew by 22% across West Africa, particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Benin. It is no coincidence these were among the most targeted countries by disinformation campaigns. Narrative control and propaganda on social media were instrumental in fomenting discontent towards France with anti-colonial rhetoric in the region, creating a permissive environment for political destabilization. Such manipulation was designed to pave the way for coups, replacing overthrown governments with friendly juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, countries that have left ECOWAS and established the Alliance of Sahel States (ASS).

This political project, with Moscow’s blessing, is not intended to stop at the current boundaries. From a geostrategic perspective, Russia’s moves in Africa likely entail the creation of a political and logistical corridor from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. After securing control of the Sahel, it is seeking access to a sea line of communication through Senegal, or the Gulf of Guinea with Togo and Benin. At the other end of this corridor, to reach the Red Sea in war-torn Sudan, the missing piece would be Chad, courted by the Kremlin in 2024 and victim of destabilization efforts in 2025. However, President Mahamat Déby was clever enough to exploit the rivalry between Western countries and Russia to his advantage.

Following Evgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny in 2023, PMC Wagner was dismantled and rebranded as Africa Corps, under the supervision of Russia’s military intelligence GRU. As of early 2026, Russia maintains a confirmed military force in seven African countries: Libya, Mali, Equatorial Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger, Sudan, and the Central African Republic. In addition, a limited foothold has been recently reported in Madagascar. Instead, efforts to establish a clandestine presence in Angola and Chad were partially thwarted by local authorities.

In 2025, Togo approved a key military cooperation agreement with Moscow, and Benin was set to sign a similar pact. The deal includes a maritime dimension, introducing “visits of military vessels” and cooperation in countering piracy and navigation. Access to the port of Lomé will allow Russia to export the resources extracted from the Sahel region. Notably, for the negotiations in Togo, the Russian delegation was led by Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and General Andrey Averyanov, deputy head of GRU. The duo was put in charge of the African portfolio and of restructuring Africa Corps. This choice is emblematic of the Kremlin’s intent to blend its political and soft power strategy with hybrid warfare when it comes to Africa. In particular, Averyanov is no ordinary officer, but the creator of GRU’s Service for Special Activities, used for all kinds of clandestine actions, including sabotage and assassinations. After Prigozhin’s death, Averyanov appeared to be the trustworthy man assigned by Putin to take care of pro-Russian African leaders.

Likewise, in Benin, the Russian ambassador hopes the visits of Moscow’s warships will become “a good tradition”. Russia’s interest was evident when, in early December 2025, a large convoy of trucks was documented transporting over 1,000 metric tons of yellowcake uranium from the Arlit mine in Niger. It was supposed to be sold to Rosatom and shipped from the port of Lomé on a Russian bulk carrier, but the threat of jihadist insurgency in northern Togo forced the cargo to stop at Niamey’s airport. On 7 December 2025, just four days after the convoy had reached Niger’s capital, a coup attempt took place in Benin. Interestingly, pro-Russian Beninese propagandist Kémi Séba publicly supported the coup, but when it was repelled with ECOWAS’s help, the leader of the putschists fled to Niger, under the protection of the local junta.

Uranium is not the only strategic raw material sought by Russia. Africa Corps also took control of multiple gold mines. According to credible estimates, between 2022 and 2024, Russia earned more than US$2.5 billion in gold, traded by the EU-sanctioned Yadran Group from Mali, Sudan, and the Central African Republic. These earnings do not even include the licenses granted in 2023 and 2025 by Burkina Faso’s junta to the Russian company Nordgold to exploit vast gold mines in Bissa, Bouly, and Kourweogo, for additional millions of profits. This would not have been possible without Russia’s soft power strategy targeting the local population with anti-Western propaganda that allowed coups and expropriations.

The Kremlin is also interested in expanding its political influence on the continent and hampering logistical projects that would favor the West, such as the Lobito Corridor, which would export copper and cobalt from Central Africa to Angola. To do so, it promoted political warfare and disinformation, investigative journalists revealed. Previous research had documented the link between Averyanov’s Africa Corps and a propaganda branch disguised as a news agency, African Initiative, established in 2023 to recruit like-minded journalists, invited for study visits to Russia and occupied Ukraine, who then amplify the Kremlin’s narratives in their respective countries. Unsurprisingly, the news about Averyanov’s negotiations in Togo was first reported by African Initiative.

Forbidden Stories and its media partners gained access to 1,431 pages of internal documents and emails detailing Russia’s clandestine strategy between 2023 and 2024 aimed at Africa and Latin America. This investigation unveiled a sort of dualism and competition between GRU-backed Africa Corps and African Initiative and SVR-backed efforts. Russia’s foreign intelligence (SVR) established its own propaganda network with a team of political advisors and former Prigozhin’s acolytes. This entity was initially registered as the consultancy “Africa Politology”, but is better known as the Company, with the declared goal “to oust the United States and France from the African continent”.

The Company’s documents, uncovered by Forbidden Stories, revealed the existence of a project called the “Confederation of Independence”, described as a “hub for expanding Russian influence”, which seems to be the model of the anti-Western Alliance of Sahel States. According to the leaks, the budget from January to October 2024 was nearly $7.3 million, mainly spent on media coverage with articles parroting Russia’s strategic narratives. Some journalists were paid up to $600 in Benin, but with higher prices in other African and Latin American countries, such as Argentina and Bolivia. The same intelligence infrastructure coordinated by the SVR was managing clandestine operations on the two continents, disguised as cultural initiatives.

The documents offer a clear view of Russia’s strategy, combining hard power and military means with soft power. The objective stated by the work plan was to reduce American, French, British, and Turkish influence, but also to blame Ukraine as a “supporter of terrorism”. The plan foresaw the launch of a political youth pan-African forum in the Sahel region to attract activists from neighboring countries, with the goal of “bringing Senegal closer to the ASS” and possibly Guinea. This plan confirms the idea of a political-logistical corridor mentioned above. In Senegal, where French troops were forced to withdraw, SVR agents developed “a scenario for a military takeover”, while in Chad, the goal was to remove the country “from the sphere of influence of France and the United States”. In February 2024, the Company was successful in pushing a reform of Mali’s mining legislation, whereas in Angola, the Lobito Corridor project was targeted by a disinformation campaign. SVR agents orchestrated a similar media pressure to revoke the license of the French company Oran to exploit uranium mines in Niger. In Namibia, they fabricated a fake letter from the UK ambassador, accusing the country of secretly financing the opposition.

All these manipulations and destabilization efforts were made possible by a network of pro-Russian journalists paid by the Company, as well as by collaborations with cultural institutions and universities. Partnerships with NGOs and the establishment of a “Russian House” are often mentioned as preliminary steps. The focus on youth shows that the Kremlin’s target is the next generation of Africans. Despite Forbidden Stories’ revelations, Russian efforts in this regard continued. For instance, in February 2026, Putin’s ambassador to Kenya inaugurated an “Africa Centre for the Study of Russia” at the University of Nairobi.

African students and academics are both targeted by SVR’s cultural network and GRU’s recruitment attempts. According to a 2024 RUSI report, GRU Unit 29155, led by General Averyanov, “has a budget allocated to pay the stipends of students from the Balkans, Africa, and other regions”. The report explains that “these stipends subsidise study and living costs and are apparently used as a vehicle for recruitment. Since these individuals are often from the elites of the target countries concerned, they are in themselves valuable sources of intelligence. However, they are also useful enablers”. Therefore, the risk of recruitment and infiltration among African students is not simply a speculation. In 2025, Russia’s cultural diplomacy agency Rossotrudnichestvo announced it received over 40,000 university applications from Africa, mostly from Sudan, Guinea, Ghana, and Chad, to assign 5,000 state-funded scholarships.

Latin America: propaganda, culture and diaspora

In Latin America, Russia offers university scholarships for hundreds of applicants every year, including 180 for students from Colombia, 60 from Bolivia, and 40 from Mexico in 2026. Similar programs were activated in Peru, Argentina, Brazil, and many other countries in the region. The Patrice Lumumba University (RUDN) was established in Soviet times to attract students from the so-called “Third World”. Nowadays, educational engagement remains a major element in Moscow’s soft power strategy, and several universities are welcoming foreign applicants.

In 2024, for instance, a student from Peru played a central role in organizing a conference on geopolitics “in a multipolar world” for Latin American students at the Patrice Lumumba University. She is also a digital influencer with thousands of followers on her social media account, which is managed by the Russian PR agency “Limitless”, funded by the Presidential Foundation for Cultural Initiatives, and led by a woman who is a former staffer of Putin’s party, United Russia. The same agency is managing several foreign influencers, including two Mexicans, one of whom is the husband of the notorious propagandist Alexandra “Sasha” Jost, openly supporting Putin’s rule. Jost is connected to agency Limitless, too, and by promoting the image of Russia abroad, this pool of young influencers is contributing to the whitewashing of the regime.

In Latin America, the Kremlin’s strategy is slightly different from Africa, but there are several analogies, starting from the Company’s network of journalists on the payroll of SVR. In particular, a group of Russian political analysts, intelligence agents, and former Wagner associates was dispatched to South America to carry out clandestine operations in Argentina and Bolivia, under the cover of cultural initiatives or media operators. In August 2024, the Company claimed it convinced Argentinian hooligans to display a banner against Ukraine during a first division soccer match in Buenos Aires, while it sent seven operatives to Bolivia for a covert propaganda operation to stabilize the then pro-Russian President Luis Arce. In 2023, under Arce’s government, Bolivia signed a US$450 million deal with Russian state firm Uranium One Group, a subsidiary of Rosatom, to build a lithium plant that will give access to 23 million metric tons of the mineral’s reserves.

Russia is pursuing a political agenda that rests on multiple platforms, including the BRICS, the G20, and bilateral cooperation. The two main trade partners are Brazil and Mexico, followed by Argentina and Ecuador. Many observers suggest that the heavy dependence on Russian fertilizers is one of the reasons behind Brazil’s refusal to join Western sanctions for the invasion of Ukraine. In Latin America, the rhetoric about the “Global South”, often reframed by Moscow as a “Global Majority” defrauded by the West, is capitalizing on anti-US resentment and growing frustration towards Europe.

In this continent, Russia’s main strategic goal is therefore to weaponize these sentiments to manipulate public opinion and gain political influence. According to the polls, Russia recorded its highest favorable rating in Latin America (51%) in 2018, but this figure declined to 34% by 2023. The following year, positive views slightly increased to 37%. Based on 2024 surveys, 56% of the respondents in Ecuador expressed a positive opinion about Russia, 51% in Peru, 45% in Bolivia, and 42% in Mexico. This trend reflects the intensified propaganda efforts and soft power initiatives promoted by Putin’s government.

While Africa Corps proved to be an essential component of the hybrid strategy to enforce deals and exploit resources, the context is markedly different for Latin America. Here, Russia typically does not rely on the military, except for a contingent that was secretly deployed to Venezuela since 2019, supposedly to guard Nicolás Maduro. The decapitation strike ordered by Trump to capture him carries deeper strategic implications for Russia. The regime in Caracas was not simply an ally, but a regional hub for a wider network across multiple layers: Cuba and Nicaragua first, then the sympathetic populist governments that come and go, depending on the region’s unstable politics.

Reports of Wagner activities in Venezuela, such as training of local forces and recruitment, were corroborated in 2024 by the picture of a military officer wearing the group’s patch on his uniform. Following Maduro’s fall, Moscow lost access to the infrastructures for any major military presence but can still rely on intelligence operatives and small paramilitary assets for covert actions. In particular, traces of at least two former Wagner mercenaries who relocated to Argentina were detected online in 2023.

This was possible thanks to a loose immigration policy, which allowed more than 120,000 Russians to travel to Argentina since 2022, many of whom have settled in the country or used it to give birth and easily obtain the local passport. The country has become a hub for the Russian diaspora, including spies, who apparently were successful in mitigating Milei’s government support for Ukraine. This wave of Russian birth tourism was also popular in Brazil, Mexico, and Chile, including for the wives of United Russia MPs or oligarchs. Such phenomenon involves a broad variety of social categories and motivations: from dissidents to opportunistic couples, but also Putin supporters and individuals in a grey zone. There are reports of rich Russian men paying pregnant women who give birth in Argentina or Brazil to be declared as fathers just to obtain a local passport. Needless to say, this might have serious security implications in the long term.

In this regard, it should be noted that Russian spies often use Latin America to build a “legend” or a fake identity before infiltrating Europe. The Dultsev couple of SVR undercover agents spent five years in Buenos Aires, GRU illegal Olga Kolobova pretended to be a Peruvian expat, GRU agent Mikhail Mikushin introduced himself as a Brazilian researcher at the University of Tromsø, his colleague Sergey Cherkasov posed as a Brazilian intern to infiltrate the ICC in The Hague. Mexico, in particular, has become a primary target of Russia’s influence operations and espionage, with a sudden and suspicious surge of “diplomatic” personnel, which is assessed by the US counterintelligence to be mainly formed by GRU officers.

In parallel, Russia is heavily investing in its propaganda network and cognitive warfare in Latin America. In 2024, the channel RT intensified its presence with a massive advertising campaign in Mexico City, addressing new segments of the Spanish-speaking world. An investigation revealed that the channel organized workshops in eight countries (Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, Guatemala, and Panama), exposing a strong partnership with Mexico City’s Club de Periodistas. RT and the Company are recruiting local reporters and influencers who are willing to amplify the narratives of Putin’s regime. In 2025, Russia also launched a fellowship program for journalists, and a four-week paid training was held in Moscow for participants from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic, who “explored the Russian media landscape” with Sputnik and RT staff.

In addition, just like in Africa, the Kremlin is relying on its network of cultural institutes and “Russia Houses” to establish connections with political elites, students, young professionals, and entrepreneurs. These institutions are often infiltrated by intelligence operatives that, under the guise of cultural diplomacy, push a different agenda. For example, it is the case of a former GRU operative who was appointed as a “project manager” of the Pushkin Institute, which teaches Russian to foreign students.

In conclusion, the Kremlin often employs soft power to pursue its strategic goals and political influence by other means. There is strong evidence of a common plan to manipulate public opinion in Africa and Latin America with a range of techniques, spanning from digital propaganda to the recruitment of students and local elites, who can be activated when they achieve an influential social status or political role. These countries often have more fragile institutional frameworks and threat awareness, but they should be vigilant to Russia’s attempt to weaponize soft power and cultural diplomacy for its political agenda.